Sequel to Avatar (2009), Avatar:
The Way of Water (2022) contains many parallels with the original film—perhaps
too many. The most outlandish, yet philosophically robust, concerns the return
of Steven Lang even though his character, the antagonist Col. Miles Quaritch,
is killed by Neytiri at the end of the first film. Lang delivers some
outstanding lines, so it is no wonder that David Cameron wanted to extend
Lang’s character’s life. In so doing, Cameron invented the devise of a
recombinant, a Na’vi artificially grown with the human Quaritch’s memories and
personality implanted in the brain. This device is fundamentally different than
a Na’vi avatar body in which a human brain is temporarily infused remotely by a
human. In the case of Jake’s avatar body, which has both Na’vi and Jake’s DNA,
there is no question that Jake’s avatar is not Jake himself. In the second
film, the lines of identity blur between the human Miles Quaritch of the first
film and the Na’vi Quaritch of the second. Cameron himself seems to be not of
one mind on the question of whether the Na’vi Quaritch is the same “person” as
the deceased human Quaritch. I contend that they are not, and, by implication,
that a person’s self-identity, based on existing (or experience of oneself)
does not rest solely with one’s memories and personality. In short, there is
more to being a person. Before applying philosophy of personhood to the
Quaritch characters in the films, I want to provide a context by briefly
laying out the extent of parallels between the two films.
In the first film, a small,
floating rock represents what pays for everything the humans are doing on
Pandora. By the second film, the solid substance, unobtanium, is curiously not
even mentioned; a liquid, amrita, extracted from the brains of (whale-like)
tulkuns, is “what’s paying for everything on Pandora now.” The fluid acts as an
anti-aging agent on humans. In the first film, a small rock represents unobtanium;
in the second, a vial of amrita represents what comes from a much, much larger
animal. The implication is that even a small sample is lucrative, and therein
lies the strong motive for the humans’ colonial exploitation of Pandora at the
expense of the Navi. Another parallel involves Lo’ak, the youngest son of Jake
and Neytiri, who is taught the sea-culture ways by Reya, son of the local chief,
in the sequel. “You bonded with an outcast!,” the chief exclaims to his
daughter. Similarly, the chief in the first film was not at all pleased when
Neytiri tells him that she has bonded with Jake’s avatar. Also, the reference
to Jake, Neytiri, and their children as “children” in the sea way of life in
the second film mirrors Neytiri telling Jake in the first film, “You’re like an
infant.” The astute viewer of the sequel may notice that Neytiri manages a
smirk when she and her family are being referred to as children, for she is
then as Jake had been when Neytiri began teaching him the ways of the forest
Na’vi. Still another parallel exists between the Tree of Souls that is on solid
ground (until the giant bulldozers come by) in the first film and the Spirit
Tree that is under water in the second film. The implication is that there is
more than one way to “connect” with Eywa, so the loss of the Tree of Souls is
not as catastrophic as it seems in the first film.
Parallelism as a tool for
relating the two films is epitomized, and I think stretched too far, in Col.
Miles Quaritch’s “return” as a recombinant in the second film. Quaritch’s
becoming conscious in the second film parallels Jake when he first inhabits his
avatar body in the first film even though a recombinant and an avatar are very
different even though both have a Na’vi body. Becoming conscious from not
having been conscious before is not like having one’s consciousness transferred
from one’s own brain to that of one’s avatar. Unlike Jake only vicariously
occupying his avatar body in the first film, the Na’vi Quaritch has no such
mind-body duality; his mind and body are fused together and thus Na’vi rather
than human. Therefore, Cameron overstates the parallelism between the Na’vi
Quaritch in the second film and Jake’s occupied avatar body in the first film.
Similarly, the parallelism between Miles Quaritch of the homo sapiens species
and Quaritch of the Na’vi species is overdone—in this case, as identity,
both in terms of a person’s identity and the identity of the two characters as
identical (i.e., the same “person”).
Yet even as preposterous as the
device to continue Steven Lang as an actor in the second film is, the
relationship between his two characters is the most philosophically rich aspect
of the second film. The political economic issues in the human colonization of
Pandora pale in comparison because ontology and existentialism are more
fundamental than political and economic thought philosophically. Indeed, my own
studies went from political economy to theology and philosophy precisely to go
deeper. From such a basis, I contend that Cameron overstates the existential self-identities
of the two characters, erroneously fusing them into one identity, and thereby
loses sight of what it is to be a particular person rather than someone else.
First, I need to unpack my term,
existential identity. The word identity applies both to a person’s awareness
of one’s self (i.e., one’s identity) and to two things being identical. Regarding
the relationship between the human and Na’vi Quaritches, which spans two films,
I could perhaps replace the adjective existential with ontological.
Ontology (i.e., about what is real) applies here to whether the two characters
are actually one entity, whereas existential places the emphasis on the
two existences of (i.e., as experienced by) the two characters—the human and
Na’vi Quaritches—without first asking whether they have the same essence. I
contend that the experience (i.e., conscious existence) of the Na’vi Quaritch includes
awareness of being a different entity than the human Quaritch. Put another way,
the Na’vi Quaritch’s conscious experience does not consist only of (the
human’s) memories (and personality). Unlike Jake’s avatar in the first film,
the existence of the Na’vi Quaritch begins when he becomes conscious. So I will argue that the Na’vi Quaritch is
not a seamless continuation of the human Quaritch. In other words, we shouldn’t
take them to be the same “person,” and thus identical, for the respective
experiences of the two characters are distinct even though they have a
personality and some memories in common. By implication, having the same
memories and personality are not sufficient to be someone.
Ontologically, the two
characters are two entities; each has his own body that is distinct and
separate from the other. They aren’t even in the same film! Even in terms of
DNA, they differ because they are, as the Na’vi Quaritch points out to Jake and
Neytiri in referring to Spider, the human son of the human Quaritch, of different
species. From this ontological basis, the Na’vi Quaritch experiences himself,
and thus his identity, as distinct from the human Quaritch, and yet, the Na’vi
Quaritch uses the first person, singular pronoun, “I” in referring to the human
Quaritch in being betrayed by Jake. Very bizarre indeed. It demonstrates that
Cameron has overreached in trying to extend Steven Lang’s character in the
first film into the second film.
Just as there is (arguably) more
to understanding than the manipulation of symbols (i.e., words) according to
rules because a person’s understanding is a part of one’s experience, similarly
experiencing oneself as a self—one’s selfhood—is not merely to have a certain
set of memories and even a certain set of personality traits. To be sure,
memories and personality are powerful ingredients in a person’s identity.
Cameron is on safe ground in having
the Na’vi Quaritch repeat lines said by the human Quaritch, such as “Do not
test my resolve” and “You’re not in Kansas anymore.” These lines resonate, and
so they could have been etched in the human Quaritch’s memory, upon which the
Na’vi Quaritch could easily draw from. They resonate so because they reflect a
distinct personality, which the two characters both have. Even an impeccably identical
vocal stress in the Na’vi Quaritch’s repetition of sayings of the human
Quaritch is plausible. “You make it real clear,” “You’re not in Kansas
anymore,” and “Lite em up” are the most notable instances. It is precisely such
lines that likely motivated Cameron to “essentially” reprise Steven Lang’s
role. It could be argued, admittedly, that people usually don’t repeat
sentences word for word, so Cameron could be overreaching and thus overstating
the identity between the two characters to give audiences more of what worked
the first time around.
Even so, Cameron does not
characterize the Na’vi Quaritch in general terms as a parrot. In fact, certain
differences, such as in the Na’vi Quaritch using the words, scalp in
referring to killing Na’vis, Mr. Sully rather than “Jake” in referring
to Jake Sully, and labcoats rather than “scientist pukes” in referring
to the scientists, can be taken as indications that the Na’vi Quaritch’s
personality is distinct from that of implanted one. It would make sense that
the experiences of the Na’vi Quaritch, which could not have gone retroactively
back into the first Quaritch, have an impact on the personality of the Na’vi
Quaritch alone. For one thing, experience with General Ardmore, which the human
Quaritch presumably does not have in the first film, may boost the Na’vi
Quaritch’s inclination show greater respect and less disdain for his enemies,
including Jake and the scientists. The General’s professionalism in torturing
Spider, for example, may rub off on the Na’vi Quaritch.
Therefore, both in terms of
memories and personality, the Na’vi Quaritch is not identical with the human
Quaritch. This suggests that the second Quaritch is at least in part his own
“man.” He could still be a continuation of the human Quaritch, but,
ontologically, barriers to a seamless continuity in terms of being the same
person exist. As I have already argued, the beginning of the Na’vi Quaritch’s
consciousness does not extend back to the human Quaritch’s existence because
consciousness is not merely of memories and personality, and the body of the
Na’vi Quaritch is distinct and separate from that of the first Quaritch. In
fact, at one point in the second film, the Na’vi Quaritch crushes the scull of
the first Quaritch! It would be absurd were the second Quaritch to say that he
is destroying part of his own body. Rather, the second clearly views the scull
as that of another “person.”
Nevertheless, the Na’vi Quaritch
is of two minds on whether he is the same “person” as the previous Quaritch.
General Ardmore also seems to be confused, though she at least seems to come to
her senses. In meeting the Na’vi Quaritch, she tells him, “A lot’s changed
since your last tour here.” The problem is that the human Quaritch had the
tour. The line is jarring, even out of
place. Fortunately, she later reminds the Na’vi Quaritch that Miles (Spider)
Socorro, a son of the human Quaritch, is “not your son.” By her tone of voice,
I suspect that she realizes that the Na’vi Quaritch has gotten carried away in
identifying himself as the human Quaritch and she is trying to draw him back to
reality. Were the General to hold both that the Na’vi Quaritch had the prior
tour of duty on Pandora and is not the father of Spider, then we would
be in a pickle, or a pretzel, for logically we would be faced with a
contraction. Unfortunately, this is precisely what confronts us when we turn to
the Na’vi Quaritch’s own statements regarding himself in relation to the human
Quaritch.
The Na’vi Quaritch oscillates
somewhat on the question of paternity, telling Spider, “I’m not your father,
technically,” and tone implies that a technicality doesn’t really matter. The
General has already sternly “reminded” the Na’vi Quaritch that Spider is not
his son. So the “but for a technicality” suggests not only that the Na’vi
Quaritch is self-identifying as the human Quaritch, but also that the
identification is an over-reach. Somewhat later, the Na’vi Quaritch disavows
paternity, telling Jake and Neytiri concerning Spider, “He’s not mine; we’re
not even the same species.” This is obviously a bluff, so Neytiri would realize
the lack of value in using Spider as a hostage, but at least the Na’vi Quaritch
is aware that he and the human Quaritch are, by implication, also not of the
same species and thus cannot be the same “person.”
That the Na’vi Quaritch comes to
care about Spider, as shown in his decision to release Jake’s daughter so
Neytiri won’t kill Spider, or that the Na’vi Quaritch even takes on a parental
role in warning Spider that he might get a whipping if he misbehaves, does not
mean that the Na’vi Quaritch takes himself to be Spider’s father, and thus the
same “person” as the human Quaritch. That the Na’vi Quaritch empathizes with
the human Quaritch, whose memories and personality have been implanted, and
whom after all has been killed by Neytiri, is understandable, and thus so too
is his assumption of the role of an adoptive parental figure. This is especially
so, as Spider could not be expected for be fully at home in Neytiri’s family.
Indeed, watching Neytiri kill a human, Spider hides from her lest her prejudice
against the Sky People punctuate itself in vengeance against all humans after
the murder of one of her sons by a human. Always one to point out that the
humans and Na’vi are different and distinct, Neytiri would naturally be
skeptical of the actual identity of the Na’vi and human Quaritches, and
yet her decision to use Spider as a hostage to get the Na’vi Quaritch to
release one of her daughters hinges the Na’vi Quaritch’s self-perception of
identity with the human Quaritch. It is not clear whether the Na’vi Quaritch
gives up his leverage by letting go of his hostage (i.e., the daughter) because
he views himself as Spider’s father, for an adoptive parent would do likewise,
but given how much the Na’vi Quaritch wants to kill Jake, I believe that the
assumption of fatherhood, and thus of being a continuation of the human
Quaritch, exists. This continuation even includes believing that what was done
to the human Quaritch was done to the Na’vi Quaritch.
At the same time that the Na’vi
Quaritch tells Jake and Neytiri that Spider is not his son, he tells Jake, “I
took you under my wing; you betrayed me.” Na’vi Quaritch’s “I” extends back to
include the human Quaritch, and yet the Na’vi Quaritch earlier insisted, “I’m
not that man, but I do have his memories.” I’m not that man and you betrayed
me. Now we are at the crux of the matter! A rational being, whether Na’vi
or human, cannot hold that what happened to another being (rational or not)
happened to oneself as if “that man” and “I” were not mutually
exclusive. Self-identity cannot embrace the identity of oneself and another
being. In other words, recognizing the human Quaritch as that man is to
recognize that he is at an existential and ontological distance. By the law of
non-contradiction, something cannot be both another entity and not another
entity. The two entities are thus not identical; they have distinct and
separate identities. This makes sense in the case of the human and Na’vi
Quaritches, as their respective experiences are different; they aren’t
even of the same species. The Na’vi Quaritch did not have a previous tour on
Pandora before he first became conscious; General Ardmore is wrong in saying so,
but she seems have realized this by the time she tells the Na’vi Quaritch that
Spider is not his son because the human Quaritch was the boy’s father. She comes to realize that the Na’vi Quaritch has
been playing the dead character. Were she present later in the film when the antagonist and protagonist finally clash in person, she might tell
the Na’vi Quaritch, No, Jake did not betray you. He betrayed the guy whose
scull you crushed in one of your hands, so move on, get over it; your life is
yours. You are not the person whom even you yourself have referred to as “that man.”
