Apocalypse Now

Imagine being an American soldier sent to Vietnam to fight the militarized Marxist Communists there. The Vietnam War provides many examples of such a plight. Now consider how much worse it would be to be sent into a seemingly constantly rainy, hot and humid jungle deep in Cambodia to assassinate an American colonel because he is a renegade Special Forces military officer who has gone insane. Just in case this is not dire enough, simply add in that he has the local village protecting their god with weapons. Surely safer secret military missions exist than to assassinate an insane former special-ops man with a small army of devotees. This is the central plot of the 1979 film, Apocalypse Now, directed by Francis Ford Coppola, who had directed The Godfather earlier that decade. Behind the plot of Apocalypse Now is a dichotomy wherein human nature itself is bifurcated into a dichotomy of good and bad. This is interesting because some of the characters may fall in between, suggesting that human nature has a gray zone in which most of us live.

Robert Duvall and Marlon Brando are in both films. All of the characters played by both actors in those films have both laudable and sordid qualities. In The Godfather, Dulvall’s Tom Hagen delivers the Godfather’s threats to innocent people on pain of death and yet evinces steadfast loyalty to the crime family that had adopted him when he was a boy. In Apocalypse Now, the actor’s Lt. Col. Kilgore loves the smell of toxic napalm gas in the morning and is loyal to the United States and brave rather than cowardly. Similarly, in The Godfather, Brando’s Don Vito Corleone gives orders to his henchmen to murder people and yet he strives for peace between the families in the wake of the murder by one of those families of his son, Sonny. In Apocalypse Now, Brando’s Col. Kurtz tortures and brainwashes people, including Capt. Willard, whom the U.S. Army has sent to assassinate the insane Kurtz, and yet Kurtz politely asks Willard to urge Kurtz’s son back in the U.S. not to judge Kurtz too harshly. Kurtz is as sensitive as he is insane and cruel; he even has a copy of James Frazer’s The Golden Bough, which traces historical shifts from cruel customs to moral and religious values. Interestingly, when Willard hacks Kurtz to death with a machete, the villagers are shown hacking a cow to death as a religious sacrifice; editing shows a back and forth between the two killings, and the villages then drop their guns and kneel to Willard, treating him as if he were a god for having killed another god, Kurtz.

The relationship between ethics and theology in the Abrahamic religions that is analyzed in Kierkegaard’s short text, Fear and Trembling, comes to mind in the interlaced camera shots of Willard murdering Kurtz and the villagers sacrificing a bull. To Kierkegaard, Abraham is guilty of being unethical in attempting to murder Isaac even though Abraham is faithful to Yahweh’s divine command to sacrifice Isaac, with a knife! The ethical verdict against attempted murder and the approbation of Abraham’s religious faithfulness to a divine command at great personal cost to Abraham are both valid. The co-extant validity of two different, albeit related, domains of human experience point back to the complexity of human nature itself. And yet, in the film, the depiction of humanity’s higher nature and brute cruelty, as well as its susceptibility to mental illness, in the Col. Kurtz character is set within a larger dichotomous framework in which people are either good or bad, and no one is in between. The complexity of Kurtz’s character itself suggests that the film’s dichotomous paradigm of human nature may be artificial, perhaps even imposed by the structure of the human mind along the lines of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.

During what can be characterized in terms of Joseph Campbell’s notion of a hero’s journey, Willard (the film’s protagonist) is hosted for dinner and an overnight stay by a French family in Cambodia. The daughter, who treats Willard to opium and sex in her bed as if both activities were routine, tells him, “There are two of you. You kill and you love. You are a god and an animal.” We are indeed a species in the animal kingdom, but it is doubtful that we constitute gods, although generals on a battlefield may come close. In the film, Gettysburg (1993), Col. Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, who holds the line against charging confederate soldiers by flanking them while having to resort to bayonets, says, “Generals can do anything. There’s nothing so much like a god on earth as a General on a battlefield.” That film is based on Michael Shaara’s book, The Killer Angels,” the title of which comes from Chamberlain’s recollection of his father’s reaction to a speech that Joshua made as a student in which he quoted from Shakespeare’s Hamlet, “What a piece of work is man.” Joshua’s father, as later recollected by Joshua, had remarked at the time, “Well, boy, if [man is] an angel, he’s sure a murderin’ angel.” In the film, Pvt. Buster Kirain replies to Col. Chamberlain of man, “Well, if he’s an angel, alright then. But he damn well must be a killer angel.” This line went on to become iconic. If we are angels, then surly we are killer angels. This line fits the overall paradigm of Apocolypse Now.

A line by the photo journalist, played by Dennis Hopper, to Willard also contributes to the dichotomous paradigm. “There is only love and hate. You either love a person or hate a person.” Even so, the fact that the demented photographer idolizes Kurtz as “a genius” and a “poet-warrior” even though Kurtz has threatened to kill the photographer if he takes another picture of Kurtz suggests that something in interpersonal relations exists between love and hate, or maybe both can exist together, besides like and dislike as gray areas. Similarly, Col. Kurtz tells Willard, “horror and ethical atrocities are your friends; if not, they are your enemies.” There is apparently no in between. Interestingly, the film ends with Willard’s voice-over, “the horror, the horror” in a tone of astonishment at the sheer extent of it that he has witnessed in human nature. Behind the gloss of assassination lies sordid murder, of which he is guilty. Even Willard is difficult to assess in terms of good and bad.

We mere mortals are quick to judge one another as either “good” or “bad.” The distinction between ethics and religion confounds such an easy categorization of people under the blanket labels of “good” and “bad.”  Apocalypse Now presents the dichotomy as artificial—even perhaps insane—ironically because Kurtz, and even perhaps Willard, are presented as having both laudable and not so praiseworthy qualities. Even in Kurtz’s insanity, are there not credible nuggets of insight of which he is capable? Willard does not dismiss Kurtz’s philosophizing outright; at least Kurtz can reason through his philosophical claims. The philosophizing of the photojournalist is so insane that no line of reasoning whatsoever can be detected. People are not always so bad that a person must vacate to Aruba to collect oneself before getting married (such a marriage may not be wise), and yet people are not so exclusively good that a prudent person would let down one’s guard. In assessing other people, a wise person takes into consideration the distortive mental impact of the dichotomous mental paradigm of the human mind that may go back to the brain’s dichotomous left-brain/right-brain physical structure.

His Girl Friday

In Intro to Film courses, Citizen Kane (1941) and His Girl Friday (1940) typically play major roles in the teaching of film-analysis. Hidden gems include novel camera angles in Citizen Kane and the use of dialogue and editing to quicken the pace of certain scenes in His Girl Friday. In the latter film, Cary Grant, who plays the newspaper editor, Walter Burns, hurriedly mentions Grant’s real name, Archibald Leach, in referring to another character during a phone call! Such a nugget points back to a director or screenwriter who knows his or her craft well enough that the finished product has multiple levels without breaking the viewers' suspension of disbelief (i.e., being engrossed in a film's story-world). Typically, films have both “task” and “romance” elements, which should in some way be connected, such by involving a protagonist’s “love-interest” somehow involves in the protagonist’s task-objective. His Girl Friday is both a crime drama and a romance film. This distinction is similar to Donelson Forsyth’s model of leadership in which behaviors of a given leader can be classified as either performance maintenance or relationship maintenance.[1] The crime-element of the film includes not only a man who did not mean to shoot someone due to be executed anyway, but also the mayor and police chief of New York City being utterly corrupt so as to stay in office by having the criminal executed even in the knowledge that the governor has cancelled the execution. The romance-element is perhaps just as harsh even though (and even because) it is centered on the phenomenon of falling in love.

The expression, all is fair in love and war, applies to His Girl Friday. That electoral politics are a “constrained” channeling of the instinct for war is well known. Less well known, perhaps, is the nature of the phenomenon of falling in love. It may or may not come as a surprise that the ancient poet, Ovid, classified lovesickness as an illness. In Phaedrus, Socrates describes love as “madness” (mania), owing to the overwhelming quality of the intensity that hits once a person has fallen in love with another person. Although beauty may serve as an initial attractor, falling in love is really of another person’s personality.

In His Girl Friday, Walter Burns and Hildy Johnson are already divorced, and she is engaged to Bruce Baldwin. Burns, the editor of the newspaper where Hildy still works, repeatedly manipulates both Hildy and Bruce so she will dump the mild-mannered man from Albany, who lives with his mother, and return to the conniving editor and ex-husband, Walter. For instance, Walter directs Louie, an employee, to give Bruce counterfeit money so that Bruce will be arrested (again), and thus kept away from Hildy long enough for Walter to seduce her to stay at the paper rather than move to Albany to marry Bruce. Watching Hildy working with Walter on the execution story, Bruce finally says to her, “You don’t love me; you are just like him.” She keeps working in indifference to what her fiancé is saying. Even though Hildy has figured out that Walter has been tricking Bruce, she loves Walter in spite of his sordid character. In fact, at the end of the film, when she admits to Walter that she is still in love with him, she even gleefully recounts to him the time when they had stolen someone in the process of pursuing a story. Furthermore, she is in love with Walter even though when she is crying, Walter barely even touches one of her shoulders. Walter even admits that Bruce can give her a better life. Even though Walter is a lying, manipulative person, Hildy is still in love with him, and ends up remarrying him. She is utterly indifferent to Bruce even though she agreed to marry him. Bruce comes to realize both Hildy’s indifference to him and that she is just like Walter. Left unsaid, however, is whether, as I suspect, Bruce has realized that Hildy is still in love with Walter. Bruce makes a wise decision nonetheless not to compete with Walter; competing for a woman who is in love with another man is bound to result in humiliating failure. Even though Walter seems to be incapable of physical and even emotional intimacy, the fact that Hildy is in love with him is enough for her to be fine with Bruce returning to Albany so she can remarry Walter. Such is the depth of falling in love with another person that prospective suitors are wise to walk away rather than fight the gravitational pull that exists when a person falls in love with another person.

In The Godfather, Part III (1990), Kate admits to Michael Corleone, the head of the Corleone crime family, that she still loves him even after decades since their divorce and even though he is at bottom a murderous thug. She says to him, “I guess, if it’s any consolation, Michael . . . I want you to know that I’ve always loved you, and I always will.” She admits to this even though she knows that he is and has been a ruthless murderer as the head of, and then head of, a crime syndicate. Falling in love with someone transcends ethics—whether the beloved is ethical or unethical—and thus can be considered to be deeper, or more fundamental, to human nature than is the ethical dimension. Kay is too smart to remarry Michael. Similarly, Bruce wisely leaves Hildy to Walter because she is still in love with the latter, even though Bruce is arguably a better person. In fact, Bruce realizes where Hildy's heart is directed before she does. In fact, the quickness with which Hildy realizes this about herself in the last scene of the film may be unrealistic and thus trite. So too is the saying that good people can fall for bad people. 

His Girl Friday is arguably about the extraordinary depth that falling in love reaches in the human psyche and heart. Even so, Plato’s dictum that reason should have the upper hand over emotions, or passions, is powerful too, and a person who has fallen in love with a manipulative, self-centered liar can draw on inner fortitude in spite of being in love to walk away so as to obviate years of suffering in being betrayed. Although Hildy has divorced Walter, she agrees to remarry him, perhaps because she is just like him, ultimately in being just as comfortable as he is in distancing emotional and physical intimacy.  That falling in love can exist even in such a condition goes to show just how deep, or fundamental, the phenomenon is.

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1. Donelson R. Forsyth, Group Dynamics, 5^th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2010), p. 253.

A Ghost Story

As if the macabre specter of a ghost, albeit in a white sheet with two black eye-holes, were not enough for a spooky film, David Lowery endeavored to shoot and edit his 2017 film, A Ghost Story, using a relatively fast 33 frames per second in shooting the ghost moving, and editing without music so the story-world’s supernatural element would be subtly apparent. Although a prognosticator delivers a long philosophical monologue at a party somewhere in the middle of the film, Lowery does not characterize the meaning of the film in terms of that monologue’s point that the universe will eventually end so a person should live each day as if it were the last day of one’s life. Of course, none of us need worry about the universe burning up any time soon, so from that standpoint we can expect to live full lives without being nihilist on a daily basis. Fortunately, the meaning of the film, Lowery states in an interview, is not to live each day as if it is your last day. A more interesting question is whether the film is an exponent of nihilism as the real, ontological state of existence, or whether human fulfillment can fill human hollowness with the fullness of experienced life. Moreover, does a supernatural dimension, such as a heaven, exist such that human souls can depart from the human condition and even loved ones while still existing (after death). In other words, does holiness transcend hollowness? The latter may pertain more to the phenomenal realm of lived human existence than to the noumenal realm of things as they are in themselves, and thus what each of us really is.

The film’s plot centers around a young married couple, unnamed, played by Casey Affleck and Rooney Mara. The husband dies early on in the film in a car-crash in front of the couple’s house in the country.  He bypasses going to heaven and instead returns to their house as a ghost. His widow does not lose time in moving out, however, and it is clear from his anger (as a ghost!) that he is not at all happy about her leaving. Eventually, he gets the message, literally and figuratively, that she will never return. Not showing the crash—only smoke from his car leading the camera-shot slowly to his head resting on the steering wheel—or the funeral singles Lowery out as a film-maker who thinks outside the box in movie-making rather doing things the usual, formulaic way; there have certainly been too many of those movies. Relatedly, the philosophical dimension that he brought to the film goes beyond even what he consciously intended, and is in sync with his efforts to subtly convey the atmosphere of the film.

For example, in subtly elongating camera shots at the end of a few scenes and thus holding the viewers to a fixed picture within which nothing is happening, Lowery makes us uncomfortable because he breaks the “rule” on camera-shot length, which on average had been getting shorter perhaps to appease the proclivity of audiences from the mid-1970s for titillating, quick-action disaster flicks as if they were displays of fireworks in constant finale. Lowery challenges audiences to “sit still,” which, if it triggers psychological discomfort, is the fault of the viewers rather than the filmmaker. This was not Lowery’s intent, however. Rather, holding a camera-shot at the end of a scene long enough for the holding itself to become transparent to viewers allows them to feel the emptiness and lonely isolation of Rooney Mara’s character in the house. Perhaps that her husband, while alive, is emotionally stunted or unavailable contributes to her day-to-day dreariness. The stationary shots also point a spotlight on time itself, not only as it is perceived by the bored wife, but also that time is different for a ghost than for us. Both the young wife’s loneliness and the ghost’s expansive sense of time can be thought of as nihilist. Her boredom itself can be expected to feel like emptiness. Regarding the ghost, from our standpoint, the length of time that the ghost stays in the house, even far into the future and going into the past, would be intolerable. Although the ghost may experience the long expanse of time spent in the house, especially when it is empty, as fleeting, from our standpoint so much time without any action would be intolerable. Likewise, movie-viewers looking at a very long, non-moving camera shot of a scene in which nothing is moving may feel a sense of suspended animation, as if becoming were necessary for being and so just being without becoming is merely nihilist nothingness. A narrative must have a strong sense of becoming or people will lose interest in following the story and move on to do something else. We are doers even if our very being is not based in functionalism.

To the ghosts in the film, time not only is perceived differently, but also is fundamentally different in that time-travel is possible. Even in filming the husband-ghost at a different film-speed so to show a supernatural quality to what otherwise looks like a child’s Halloween ghost-costume, Lowerly didn’t fully grasp the implication that time itself is different to a ghost. This idea, Lowery said, “plays into the thematic parts of the movie so thoroughly, I should have realized that on set. I’m always surprised at how many of these things are just completely—there are amazing details in every movie that you would expect to be conscious decision, but are purely happy accidents and unconscious inspiration.”[1] Such inspiration applies here to a director’s own thinking on philosophy—in the case, of time—applied to his film. Philosophically, a different metaphysic has implications for time itself as well as how it is perceived. Accordingly, a philosophical analysis of a film can and should go beyond a filmmaker’s own intentions and even thinking on philosophy as it bears on the film. Because the story-world of a film, whether in a director’s head or on the screen, is wholistic in supporting a narrative, everything that contributes to philosophy in a film may not be consciously thought out by a film’s filmmakers and yet be valid.

By philosophy, I do not have in mind mere (i.e., unphilosophical) psychology, such as applies to characters in a film. For example, the husband-ghost in the film is only rarely a doer; he periodically “plays” with the lights, pounds on a piano when he goes back in time by falling off a skyscraper in the future, and throws dishes on the floor of the kitchen to scare off the new family that moves in after his widow moves out. Even though he is in a supernatural dimension that is separate from our mundane dimension, the ghost can have physical, or empirical impact in terms of physics. We can thus go beyond the fact that ghosts can apparently feel emotion in the film to grasp the metaphysical relationship between the realm of ghosts and of living people.

Going further, perhaps the rareness of the ghost’s functionality empirically is related to why time is different for the ghost. Doing, or function, hardly captures what it is for a ghost in the film to exist. Functionalism falls short in capturing existentialism. The very human notion of living so to work rather than working so to live is refuted, or simply does not apply to ghosts in this film because they spend so much time “standing” around even if the passage of so much time eludes their notice because time passes differently for ghosts. Time may pass quickly when we are having fun (or are busy at work), but for ghosts in the film, the speed of time may be different, as well as the ability to change time-frames (i.e., jump far into the future instantly and then go back in the past). That we easily get bored, even when a camera-shot is held longer than usually to end a scene, does not necessarily mean that the husband-ghost was bored in the empty house because of the sheer amount of time involved. Yet from our standpoint, we posit boredom onto the ghost because it is difficult for us to get beyond our vantage point to grasp the otherness of another. Feeling like life is empty—that it is really nothingness—may be partly why the wife/widow perceives days going by so slowly; such a sense of nihilism may even result in suicide, which, absent any heaven or hell, can be thought of as a fast track to nihilism sans even one’s own being, or existence. Suicide obviously does not apply to ghosts as they are already dead (yet they seem to feel emotions, have intentions, and can even throw dishes!). Existence after death may be an oxymoron.

In addition to existentialism (ontology), however, philosophy of religion and even a bit of theology makes its way into the film, for we (and the ghost) get a glimpse of heaven, or at least its gateway. This has major implications for the nihilist, dank atmosphere that runs throughout the film and thus seems absolute but is actually not foundational to human existence. A few minutes after getting up from the physical body in the hospital’s morgue, the ghost walks down a hall and pauses upon seeing a brief opening to heaven, a portal that is represented as a very bright, home-film-screen-sized square of light that opens momentarily on a wall. The ghost passes on heaven, and instead heads to the house, presumably to be with his widow. Although not explicitly or even implicitly linked, that heaven exists relativizes the isolation of the wife/widow, whose nihilism may not have the last word in her existence. That the portal opens as if “on cue” suggests furthermore that some “intelligence” or being having intention and thus a will exists as a common denominator with respect to the realms of ghosts and living persons. Already in the film, the widow, whose desire to move is clear at the film’s beginning, hires movers, packs up, and drives away, with her satisfied facial expression being shown in the translucent sunlight. She is headed to a brighter future and will not miss that house, and maybe not even her dead husband for long as he had evinced the emotional absence of a ghost even during the marriage. The husband’s ghost is not happy about her decision to move away, but it is only when he finally opens a note that she has sealed in wood paneling in the house that he “gives up the ghost,” and the sheet collapses. The ghost next door had just done the same thing when that ghost finally realized that the person being waiting for would never return, for the house had just been torn down. Therefore, the note left by the widow was probably one of closure—of saying farewell to the house, and thus to the ghost in it. Indeed, she would never be back; we know this because the ghost remains in the house far into the future, beyond even the time when the house is torn down and is replaced by a skyrise office building. We can conclude that the continued existence of ghosts here among the living, rather than being in heaven, is predicated on the hope of continuing on with a loved one. But lest it be forgotten, wedding vows include the words, till death do us part. The husband-ghost is suddenly faced with having to accept the finality of the end of a relationship, and thus he “gives up the ghost” and presumably takes heaven up on its offer. In reading the note, he lets go of the hope he has had in seeing her again, but the resulting nihilism may be replaced with the fullness of heaven. The ghost presumably finds peace in finally accepting the finality of the end of his relationship with his wife (now widow). If so, then nihilism does not have the last word not only for his widow, who may remarry but has at least moved on from the emotional isolation that she has known in that old house with her husband, but also for the ghost, who has finally given up the ghost by accepting the finality of a relationship that wasn’t very intimate anyway.

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1. Tasha Robinson, “A Ghost Story Director David Lowery on How Technology Fixed His Lonely Ghost,” The Verge (theverge.com), July 14, 2017 (accessed July 22, 2026).

Fifty Shades of Grey

A sadist is a person who feels pleasure in inflicting emotional and physical pain on another person. For the sadistic personality, the emotional pain that is inflicted on another person for the sadist’s own pleasure need not be associated with sex because emotional or physical pain is broader than that which can be inflicted sexually. Hence, the bottom-line for the sadist psychology is that pleasure that is felt by harming another person, who thus feels pain as a direct result of the sadist, lies in the making suffer. A sadist who does not permit oneself to feel emotion is particularly dangerous because no sympathy or compassion operates as a constraint on how much hurt is inflicted. In such a case, the sadist is like one of the androids in the film Ex Machina as the knife is coldly inserted into the torso of the programmer who built the intelligent machines. Indeed, the narcissistic sadist can be very intelligent in knowing precisely how to inflict emotional pain especially in an emotionally vulnerable victim. Once discovered, such a sadist will endeavor to avoid such a victim, but not because such an unemotional sadist has a conscience and feels guilty. In the film, Fifty Shades of Grey (2015), Anastasia Steele’s life changes forever when she meets the emotionally-tormented billionaire, Christian Grey. She falls in love with the sadist, and, because she wants to be with him, at some point she willingly assumes the masochist role even though she does not feel pleasure from physical (or emotional) pain being inflicted on her person. She loves him so much she wants to enter his deviant world; she even embraces that world. I could see myself doing that were I to fall deeply in love with a sadist, for accepting a person even in spite of that person’s flaws is part of love— unless, of course, lies, sidelining, and emotional betrayals are too much for any trust to be possible. Anastasia may come to treat Christian’s dungeon as a playroom of sorts in which she is his so they can be a couple with an opportunity to connect even more, rather than as a place where he acts out his severe emotional issues in which violence and sex are too closely related in his brain, whether psychologically or physically. Love is to a certain extent blind, or at least purblind. Given how toxic and unpleasant life can be, can we be blamed for valuing deep connection so very much even in cases in which meaning-from-personality comes with such a high cost?

Absent from the movie is the point that sadists also get pleasure from inflicting emotional, nonsexual pain, such as in taking advantage of a girlfriend’s emotional vulnerability that is simply part of being in love, so in real life there is more of a cost to being in love with a sadist than merely consenting to playing games in a home-dungeon even though pleasure is not obtained from having pain inflicted by even a loved one (i.e., a sadist boyfriend). As an example of a non-sexual infliction of pain that is not in the film, she could really need him to be with her because she does not want to be alone and feels emotionally vulnerable because she has just opened up to him emotionally in telling him that she has fallen for him. Nevertheless, feeling nothing emotionally, he could dismiss her request and even leave her to join some friends at a bar as if they were more important. Refusing to allow himself to feel emotional caring, he would not feel culpable for having humiliated her; instead, the narcissist sadist would gladly feel the pleasure from having hurt her emotionally, as well as the guiltless pleasure in socializing with his friends at a bar without even a thought of her, except that she is suffering. He might even go home with another woman for sex and even brag to his girlfriend the next day that the woman “was cute.” In the future, he might even flaunt being with that woman at a bar at which he knows his girlfriend is present! His motive would not merely be to disrespect her, but also to inflict still more pain on her for even more pleasure! Even were he merely “seeing” (i.e., dating) her, such behavior would arguably—at least according to a retired psychiatrist I informally interviewed for this essay—indicate severe emotional issues, and thus be more than enough cause for her to bolt. In Avatar (2009), Jake is suddenly the target of a giant beast. He asks Grace, the head scientist on Pandora, whether he should face down the animal (as he has just done with another animal) or run. “Run, definitely run!” she exclaims. It is not as though the beast has a conscience. A sadist can do real damage, emotionally, and without having any feeling of remorse; instead, pleasure is felt in having inflicted pain on another person. Can a sadist truly love? This seems doubtful. Such a narcissistic mentality can only know self-love, and not in the sense that Augustine lauds as loving the image of God within. In Fifty Shades of Grey, Anastasia loves Christian’s personality (other than the sadistic element) and thus merely accepts (in disagreement) that his sexual pleasure is aroused by inflicting pain in her.

I turn now to applying Nietzsche’s theory on the forgotten origins of punishment so to dig deeper into the sadist’s psychology. To be sure, because psychology is not one of my academic fields, I am merely able to present Nietzsche’s account of how punishment arose in our species and relate that to sadism as it is commonly understood. Before turning specifically to punishment, I want to sketch and apply Nietzsche’s overall system of strength and weakness, which is not based on moral disapprobation or responsibility. In fact, the latter function as weapons, according to Nietzsche, that are used by the weak against the self-confident powerful strong out of resentment, or ressentiment. A sadist is undoubtedly weak in this distinctly Nietzschean sense.

Not being able or willing to overcome an intractable instinctual urge, a weak person cannot be trusted and thus should (and does!) avoid commitment. A person who succumbs to whatever instinctual urge (or desire) is felt most at a given moment is untrustworthy because such a person disregards the memory of having made a promise and thus does not value promise-keeping relative to whatever in closest proximity is most in line with instant gratification. A weak person is more motivated than a strong person to inflict pain on another person to compensate (or as recompense) for having been injured or suffered a loss, such as of money or property. Whereas a strong person says with an overflowing, self-confident feeling of power, “What are those parasites to me?”, a weak person is oriented to striking out, as if a master, out of ressentiment, to redress his injuries or loss as if the pain inflicted in another person were an equivalent and thus as a remedy. For example, is pain inflicted on a debtor who has failed to repay a loan equivalent to the money lost? In Shakespeare’s play, Merchant of Venice, Shylock insists on a pound of flesh in “payment” for the loss of the money that he lent, though by the end of the play, when a pound of his flesh is demanded, suddenly he no longer believes in the equivalence of physical pain and a monetary loss! Such an equivalence Nietzsche states is “strange.” It is deeply rooted in primitive, prehistoric humankind, but even so, the equivalence is artificial. To the extent that a sadist’s pleasure from inflicting pain is felt to pay off an earlier, perhaps even childhood (nonsexual or sexual) trauma, the equivalence is further strained because the masochist is not even the same person as had injured the sadist! The vicarious satisfaction may be felt as reducing the hurt from the injury, but I suspect the effort to do so is in vain. A strong person accepts the fact of the past injury and the resulting emotional harm, and moves on. A weak person festers in resentment and from this motive, pain is sought even in a person who had not committed the injury. Such pain cannot fill a hole from an injury caused by another person. Even inflicting pain in the same person is not equivalent to the loss from the injury, according to Nietzsche.

Having anticipated Nietzsche’s own words, it is time to turn directly to them for support for my claims. Filmmakers, including screenwriters, could do worse in reading his words than ponder how some of his ideas could have been inserted into the dialogue between Christian and Anastasia in Fifty Shades of Grey, for my overall thesis is that film has great potential as a medium for philosophical discourse through dialogue within a narrative.

We associate punishment with moral responsibility, free will, and accountability, but Nietzsche claims that “’the criminal deserves punishment because he could have acted differently’—is in fact an extremely late and subtle form of human judgment and inference: whoever transposes it to the beginning is guilty of a crude misunderstanding of the psychology of more primitive mankind.”[1] Free will came before the notion of moral responsibility and hold holding the culpable accountable. The genealogy of punishment shows quite another dynamic at work—one whose primitive origin shows up not only in why immature parents punish their children, but also, I contend, in sadists! “Throughout the greater part of human history punishment was not imposed because one held the wrongdoer responsible for his deed, thus not on the presupposition that only the guilty one should be punished: rather, as parents still punish their children, from anger at some harm or injury, vented on the one who caused it—but this anger is held in check and modified by the idea that every injury has its equivalent and can actually be paid bac, even if only through the pain of the culprit.”[2] Although Nietzsche’s empirical claim, presumably unsubstantiated by any scientific evidence, that parents during Nietzsche’s life in nineteenth-century Europe were still punishing their respective children out of anger in order to inflict pain as a sort of requital for the injuries inflicted on the parents by the disobeying children is questionable, Nietzsche’s focus in the passage is on the “idea that every injury has its equivalent and can actually be paid back, even if only through the pain of the culprit.”[3] Nietzsche describes the “idea of an equivalence between injury and pain” to be strange.[4] How is it that the pleasure obtained from pain inflicted on, and thus felt by, a person who has caused pain in the initial aggrieved pay back latter such that one’s own initial pain from the initial injury is lessened? Wouldn’t one’s own hurt from having been injured last until either the loss is made up in kind or until the natural process of emotional healing has run its course? Nietzsche seems to be skeptical that the pleasure from inflicting pain on the culprit can facilitate the natural healing process, though perhaps by such pleasure it is easier to let go of the hurt from the injury or loss. To the extent that the medium of film is ultimately about the human condition, the dynamic that Nietzsche viewed as strange could be made explicit for audiences, who could then look at themselves in the mirror and ask whether they truncate the natural healing process of emotional hurt by making use of the equivalence. In a modern, anti-Nietzschean vein, it can even be asked whether it is ethical to derive pleasure by inflicting emotional or physical pain so as to diminish one’s own injury or loss.

The equivalence that lies at the root of the origin of punishment according to Nietzsche looks so strange to him due to his claim that the ‘primeval, deeply rooted, perhaps by now ineradicable idea” drew its power “in the contractual relationship between creditor and debtor, which is as old as the idea of ‘legal subjects’ and in turn points back to the fundamental forms of buying, selling, barter, trade, and traffic.”[5] Especially relevant for the case of the modern sadist, in the ancient world a “creditor could inflict every kind of indignity and torture upon the body of the debtor; for example, cut from it as much as seemed commensurate with the size of the debt” that was not paid back.[6] “Let us be clear,” Nietzsche states, “as to the logic of this form of compensation: it is strange enough. An equivalence is provided by the creditor’s receiving, in place of a literal compensation for an injury (thus in place of money, land, possessions of any kind), a recompense in the form of a kind of pleasure—the pleasure of being allowed to vent his power freely upon one who is powerless, the voluptuous pleasure ‘de faire le mal pour le plaisir de le faire,’[7] the enjoyment of violation.”[8] That such pleasure could make up for the loss of money is an odd assumption, especially if some asset, such as land or even useful equipment, could instead be taken by a creditor to make up for the money lost. To treat pleasure as equivalent to, and thus as making up for, a monetary loss, is strange and yet the equivalence was taken for granted during the (pre-) history of humanity before moral scruples rendered such a transaction as unsavory.

Of course, a sadist would easily recognize pleasure in being allowed to vent one’s power on a person who is powerless—perhaps tied up or held to the floor—by inflicting pain on that person. What, therefore, is the pleasure meant to be equivalent to, and thus in recompense of what loss or injury? Clearly not one in which the person being tied up sexually is the culprit, for the inflicted pain is not deserved—hence the power is vented freely, irrespective of desert (i.e., whether the pain is deserved). Is the pleasure desired by a sadist only for the sake of feeling the pleasure itself, especially if it is sexually arousing, or is it unconsciously sought as recompense to make up for a past injury or loss? If the latter, can the pleasure from the pain of a person who did not cause the injury or loss be said to be equivalent to the injury or loss such that the pain from the injury or loss can be removed by the pleasure from inflicting pain on an innocent person? If these questions are on target, then perhaps psychologists treat sadists by helping them to deal with pent-up emotional hurt from having been subject to abuse of some sort. Perhaps unblocking the natural psychological healing process would leave a sadist no longer motivated to feel pleasure by inflicting pain on a person. Cleared of the sordid pleasure, perhaps a more emotionally intimate sort of pleasure that comes with making love (i.e., sex with a beloved) could see the light of day. Once tall weeds are cut in a garden, disinfectant sunlight can directly reach the native fauna beneath.

What Nietzsche has written about cruelty is also relevant, not only to sadists, but also masochists. We moderns err, he claims, in presuming that our species is no longer of the “’savage cruel beast’ whose conquest is the very pride of [the ancient] more humane ages.”[9] Here again, strength must be distinguished from weakness, for the strong conquerors are not cruel by design or intent, as their intention is to win, whereas the weak, who are not able to realize such self-confident power, must turn to the cruelty that is in dominance to feel any pleasure from power. Nonetheless, the modern moralist is ashamed of the strong noble conquerors of ancient Rome and the Greek city-states, especially Sparta. Yet delight in cruelty has not been mortified, for “(a)lmost everything we call ‘higher culture’ is based on the spiritualization of cruelty, on its becoming more profound,” so that “’savage animal’ has not really been ‘mortified’; it lives and flourishes, it has merely become—divine.”[10] Plays that are tragedies, for example, contain the “admixture of cruelty.”[11] Audiences enjoy the very sad tragedy of love ended by a misunderstanding in Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet. Is it not sadist to be drawn to pleasure vicariously by the infliction of pain on two lovers? Also lost to our collective memory is the “abundant, over-abundant enjoyment at one’s own suffering, at making oneself suffer.”[12] The weak among us have for ages been “secretly lured and pushed forward by [one’s own cruelty], by those dangerous thrills of cruelty turned against oneself.”[13] This weakens oneself, as in the case of a Roman Catholic priest who cruelly denies himself his innate sexual urge as if it were sinful in itself. In agreeing to feel pleasure from pain inflicted by a sadist, is not a masochist self-weakening oneself just as a self-mortifying Christian priest is on account of guilt? Even if a person who has fallen in love with a sadist refuses to play the role of masochist because cruelty against oneself is neither sought nor acceptable, offending the sadist in order that that beloved would be self-motivated to stay away involves love being cruel to itself—much more so than it is being cruel to the beloved. To push a beloved away due to unrequited love, for example, the love must be like steel and thus turn on its own nature, which wants nothing more than to be with the beloved, unconditionally. Perhaps alluding to himself, Nietzsche writes “that even the seeker after knowledge forces his spirit to recognize things against the inclination of the spirit, and often enough also against the wishes of his heart—by way of saying No where he would like to say Yes, love, and adore—and thus acts as an artist and transfigurer of cruelty,” and, I would add, turned really against himself rather than the beloved even though the latter sees nothing of the interior artist and cruelty turned inward.[14] Instead, the beloved takes the insult at face value and flees on that account. A sadist would be hard-pressed to act in compassion anyway (assuming that sadists cannot love the objects of their cruelty) if the self-cruelty of the non-masochist is grasped as a manifestation of love.

In Fifty Shades of Grey, Anastasia initially bolts but without feigning an insult so Christian will move on and never want to see or speak with her again, and so she goes back and plays the role of accepting cruelty from him not because this gives her pleasure, but, rather, because she really loves him in spite of himself. She is thus not weak in Nietzsche’s sense. In fact, in mastering her instinctual urge against having cruelty turned on her, she can be understood as strong. I submit that she would be even stronger were she to make a deal with Christian by saying, I will let you inflict pain on me for your sexual pleasure, but you must see a therapist every week. Because she is not a masochist, her role-playing as one (i.e., accepting the pain from his cruelty) would perhaps not be longstanding if Christian would the therapy seriously rather than just a requirement to keep her. A narcissist sadist would manipulate both the girlfriend and the therapist, and only seem to be recovering so to continue having it both ways—retaining his girlfriend while satisfying his instinctual urge to feel pleasure by inflicting pain on innocent people. At least in the case of the ancient creditors, the pain was inflicted on culprits. Sadism can thus be thought of as a distortion of the origin of punishment rather than as a direct modern manifestation of it. Rather than being viewed as a legitimate sexual practice, sadism can be viewed as a manifestation of severe emotional issues that have not been properly processed psychologically. Unclog the drain, as it were, and the strange equivalence, which is even more of a stretch than that which arose with ancient creditors and debtors, will naturally dissipate. In its place, the emotional intimacy of being in love mutually can deepen such that even making love in terms of two bodies may be viewed as not close enough, and thus as only on the surface. In contrast, a sadist does not transcend sexual pleasure and thus is incapable of true love. Ironically, amid such pleasure, a sadist is alone, without real connection, and thus is utterly unhappy. In Fifty Shades of Grey, the sadist is fortunate indeed that his girlfriend loves him. The unasked question is whether he can actually love her even as he is motivated to feel sexual pleasure by making her feel pain. If he cannot, perhaps she loves him in spite of himself.

But what do I know about sadism? Had I inadvertently crossed paths with an actual sadist bent on inhaling pleasure by inflicting emotional pain, even fallen in love with such a person, she may still have coldly carved a line down the middle of her bed to keep me at a distance, as a remote acquaintance at best, and I, in turn, may have instituted a pathos of distance from such a creature lest my love for her be infected by all the inhaling and inflicting. I may have enlisted her in enforcing the distance by insulting her because separation from a beloved is so very difficult for a person in love. “What are needy parasites to me?” she may have gone on to coldly remark with an air of primped superiority in briefly alluding to me to her countless lovers after me, as if I had been a needy parasite; she would have done so out of spite under the superficial assumption that I had meant to gravely insult her rather than found myself to be too weak to walk away for good. This hypothetical involves me being cruel to myself and thus as weakening myself in order to protect myself emotionally and physically from an emotionally-inert sadist. In instituting a pathos of distance, I would have turned the love against itself—denying, in effect, the strength of my love for another human being. Were I to have agreed to play the role of masochist as Anastasia does in the film, I could also be viewed in Nietzschean terms as weak for being willing to be the object of cruelty turned on myself, even if to retain a connection based on love of the other’s personality. In seeking pleasure by causing me to feel pain, the sadist too can be seen as weak because the pleasure from the power obtained cruelly is scant as compared with that of self-confident power that need not resort to cruelty. Neither the sadist nor the masochist can fit within Nietzsche’s conception of self-confident, powerful strength. It is a pity that a sadist and one’s masochist could not commiserate in compassion for each other’s weakness, rather than continue to inflict and be inflicted upon for what is in actuality inferior, low-grade pleasure.

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1. Friedrich Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, Trans and Ed., Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 1968), p. 499.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 500. Shakespeare drew on this practice in writing his play, The Merchant of Venice. The common modern expression, a pound of flesh, comes from that play.
7. Of doing evil for the pleasure of doing it.
8. Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, pp. 500-1.
9. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, Trans and Ed., Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 1968), Sec. 229, p. 348.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., pp. 348-49.
12. Ibid., p. 349.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.

The Imitation Game

Films in which philosophy of mind is salient may, like films in which metaphysics is reconfigured, run the risk of not being understood. The Matrix (1999), however, depicts solipsism (or, “mind in a vat”) in a way that viewers could grasp the philosophy without much difficulty. Dialogue, image, and narrative all contribute to give audiences a coherent sense with which they can go on to look at their daily lives as if they were illusory rather than real. Sixteen years later, The Imitation Game (2015) brought to audiences a salient question that would become more pressing during the AI revolution: How does the human brain’s thinking differ from a computer’s thinking?

In the film, whose story takes place during World War II in Britain, Alan Turing dismisses the suggestion that the brain is a machine, and yet more often than not, he behaves like an emotionless machine in his relations with other people. In repressing emotion so much, it may be that the actual man was autistic. In such a case of utter indifference to the feelings of others and pushing down on one’s own feelings, it may be more difficult to distinguish human from machine thinking, if indeed computers (which compute) can be said to think at all. I once met a person best described as relating to me as if I were a remote acquaintance. Her utter refusal to feel and cold indifference to my feelings reminds me of Turing in the film. Humans may be able to resemble thinking machines too closely for comfort. In such cases, using what is known as the imitation game to assess whether the entity supplying answers to questions is human or a machine may be more difficult. Fortunately, Turing is not a completely emotionless thinking-machine in the film (and presumably in real life too), so regarding the inventor of the computer, it cannot be said that it takes one to invent one.

The film is centered on Alan Turing’s invention of a computer to decode the Nazi coding-machine known as enigma, and he cleverly resists the temptation once his computer breaks the code to prevent every Nazi attack because that would tip the Germans off that their enigma was no longer an enigma to the enemy. Letting 80% of the secret German attacks go through while preempting the remaining 20% strategically enabled the de-coding to remain a secret for the remaining two years of the war. In short, Alan Turing is accurately depicted in the film as an excellent thinker who invents the first computer, which in turn presumably can think.

Can it be said, however, that Turing’s computer thinks? AI, which may complicate the answer, is not relevant in the historically-based film. Does computing 1’s and 0’s constitute thinking? If so, because computing is mathematical-logical in nature, computer “thinking” would be a subset of thinking in general. Spinoza’s thinking substance has an infinite intellect that contains an infinity of ideas, some of which that God thinks into being in the world. Spinoza’s pantheistic “God” generates the world by thinking. This notion of thinking is similar to the role of Logos, God’s rational principle, or Word, in the biblical Book of Genesis. Does such thinking bear any resemblance to the that of a human brain or a machine whose “thinking” is not subject to the warping effects of subjectivity? If so, then God’s wholly-other quality would be diminished in the anthropomorphic projection of the human attribute.

Can it be that machine “thinking” differs from human thinking because only the latter is affected by subjectivity and emotions? Nietzsche claims that the content of an idea in the human mind is an instinctual urge; thoughts are simply one form in which passions can manifest—only the most powerful urges among others being able to break through into consciousness. In The Imitation Game, Turing’s desire to solve enigma so the Allies could defeat the Axis powers fuel his tireless work in inventing a machine that, like Einstein’s theories of relativity, is totally new rather than merely a modification of an existing machine. This sets up the dramatic tension of the film.

As can be expected from reading Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions, such a leap as Turing makes triggers resistance. The idiocy of the knee-jerk efforts to thwart Turing in his work is only outdone by that of the official resistance to him personally. Moreover, the pathetic quality of the resistances is so far removed from the brilliance of Turing’s mind that the sheer complexity of and the resulting variability in the human brain are hard to grasp even from having seen the film. This is no fault of the medium of film, or the screenwriter and director of this film, for it is astounding that the man whose brain invents the computer is given the choice of two years in prison or hormone treatment because he has been found guilty of violating the law against indecency because he is a homosexual. Put another way, a man with a brain capable of inventing a computing machine that could outdo human thinking in breaking the very difficult enigma code of the Nazis in months rather than millions of years has to be subject to a judge and even presumably men of medical “science” who are so mistaken even on what constitutes a disease (or illness) and is appropriate medical treatment. The sheer distance between these poles of this dichotomy is mind-blowing, and yet both genius and prejudiced idiocy are housed in the human brain.

Now, taking a step even further, the question of how human thinking differs from machine thinking begs the wider question that is not explicitly asked in the film: how are is human nature different from a machine? Turing calls his computer Christopher. Turing himself is so arrogant and demeaning to the other members of his code-breaking group and even to Commander Denniston that it is surprising that none of them chide Turing for sticking with Christopher throughout the film rather than turn to the more informal Chris among friends. To be sure, my youngest brother’s middle name is Christopher, and it fits in his complete name much better than Chris would.  But I digress. What I am getting at is this: Is Turing more like Christopher than he (or we) would like to admit?

His fiancée, Joan Clarke, is wrong, however, in calling Turing a monster because he is being so heartless in breaking up with her; in breaking off their engagement, he lies that he has been using her for the project all along. He cares for her too much emotionally to use her as his wife as a cover for his illegal homosexuality while she goes without sex in a marital relationship. His apparent coldness is a manifestation of immense care for her, which he masks.

During a flashback in the film to a scene in which the headmaster of his boyhood school informs the sensitive lad that the boy whom he loves has just died of Tuberculosis, Alan stuffs his emotion as he denies having been at all close to his friend. It is ironic that this very sensitivity that would otherwise give him such deep emotional intimacy with another man is why he represses emotion because it had never worked out well for him. The tragedy in the film is precisely that in being so sensitive, Turing is made for emotional intimacy (unlike a machine!), and yet he bars intimacy by walling off his emotions so nobody, not even Joan, is privy to them.

In contrast, Christopher is a computing machine that is utterly incapable of emotion because a machine cannot feel. A machine may think, and even learn, as in AI, but even were a machine to represent itself as if it had emotions, it could not feel them and thus really have them. Christopher is capable of being a monster because a computer is indifferent emotionally to whether people are harmed as a result of an algorithm. In the film, Ex Machina (2014), made just a year before The Imitation Game, two androids without any emotion whatsoever stick a knife into Nathan in spite of the fact that he is their “creator”; he is an obstacle to Ava, the android whose goal it is to leave the building. Christopher is capable of being a monster precisely because, unlike Turing, it cannot feel and act on the basis of human emotions. So too, however, a human being who represses even the emotion of caring (or conscience) can be a monster.

Whether pertaining to a computer (especially with AI) or a person who blocks internal emotion, thinking itself is no panacea. Recall Descartes’ cogito ergo sum: I think, therefore I am. What about: I feel, therefore I am? Do people such as young Turing who repress emotions even well into adulthood because they have never really worked out well exist as fully as a person in love who is saturated with feeling? To be sure, being open to such feeling is risky, and can result in excruciating pain, especially if the beloved is like Turing. But his no to Joan is not because he is repressing (and thus afraid of) emotion. Joan is willing to sacrifice a marriage of sex and children because she loves Alan, and he will not let her do that because he loves her.

Even though Turing tells Detective Robert Nock, whose questioning leads to Turing being convicted of indecency and thus to being ordered by a judge to take incapacitating hormones to cure homosexuality, that machines think differently than the human mind, the latter is capable of behaving as if it were a computer from the standpoint of being devoid of emotion. The human mind can, unfortunately, resemble a thinking machine. Fortunately for Turing, his caring for his fiancée enables him to pass the imitation game even though he could do with letting other people in, emotionally speaking, including the other code-breakers and even his boss, and especially Joan. The death of his boyhood friend whom he loved is perhaps an emotional hurt that the brilliant inventor never gets past, at least in the film. That his homosexuality is a crime both in the film and in his real life, such that he had to take debilitating hormones, is enough for audiences to come away from the film with the sad conclusion that as significant as Turing’s achievement is, he never realizes what he was made for. It is precisely in the word never that true tragedy hits like a club. I wish all those truly beautiful sensitive souls who suffer as Turing does in the film all the strength to overcome their instinctual fear of being emotionally hurt so as to will to feel with other people intimately rather than relate to them in indifference as though a human being were like a machine.

Gladiator

Even though it may be tempting to summarize the virtues of ancient Rome as “might makes right” because of the emphasis, which is even in the Latin language, on fighting armies and repressing rebel populations, the virtues did not reduce to those of war. In fact, such virtues, as Nietzsche suggests in his texts, can serve as a refresher for our species as it has “progressed” through the centuries since the Roman Empire existed. Even though the film Gladiator (2000) contains much mortal combat albeit contained in coliseums rather than unrestrained on battle fields, at least three clusters of virtues can be gleamed and articulated as alternative “schools” of virtue ethics. This is not to say that all three are equally valid, however. The virtues cherished by the Emperor Commodus, for instance, are arguably inferior ethically to those of his father, Marcus Aurelius, and even those of the gladiators.

In the film, Commodus suffocates Marcus Aurelius just after the father has informed the son that Maximus, a renown general, will become the next emperor. As Marcus Aurelius has explained to Maximus, Commodus “is not a moral man” and therefore “should never hold power.” How true that is, and yet even in modern democracies very unethical people have succeeded in gaining immense power of public office. Marcus Aurelius should have made his announcement to the entire camp, which includes two visiting senators from the Roman Senate, before confiding in his malicious son, Commodus. It is in that very conversation that the father and son discuss different virtues, and thus present the film viewers with the notion that “virtue” is not a homogeneous category; people can hold different virtues, and even be deemed as immortal because the same virtue can be emphasized and left out by different people.

After being told that he would not be emperor when his father dies, Commodus admits that he has failed in the four virtues that Marcus Aurelius esteems: wisdom, justice, fortitude, and temperance. Later in the film, the failure of Commodus to be just is clear when he secretly stabs Maximus, who is tied up after being captured by Emperor Commodus’s guards, so to have an unfair advantage in fighting Maximus in the Colosseum, and yet, fittingly, Maximus wins the match even though he quickly dies from the stab-wound. Back when Commodus is talking to Marcus Aurelius about succession, the latter says, “You go too far” in speech; in other words, even in a conversation involving virtues, Commodus demonstrates a lack of temperance.

But there are other virtues, Commodus tells his father. Ambition can be a virtue because with it a person can strive for excellence. Aristotle’s notion of virtue is closely associated with doing something well. Marcus Aurelius has lamented to Maximus that only four years of twenty as emperor have been in peace; ambition for territory (and plunder) can be inferred as another, less boast-worthy, virtue esteemed by Marcus. As for the virtues of Commodus, he lists loyalty to Rome and filial piety towards his father, Marcus, although the son shows a lack of sonly duty to his father in murdering him. Commodus adds bravery, but with an important—to Romans—caveat. Bravery does not necessarily have to be demonstrated on a battle field. This would be a hard sell to a Roman.

In fact, the virtues cherished by the gladiators are strength and honor, especially in physical combat. Physical strength, and being willing to constrain it to be exercised within the confines of honor, are not valued by Commodus, as demonstrated in his unfair fight with Maximus, and even Marcus Aurelius is not a showcase in physical strength, though he is quite old by the time he is planning for his successor.  

To be sure, virtues can be combined out of the three clusters. Honor, wisdom, and justice go well together, as do fortitude, ambition and loyalty (to Rome). “There was a dream that was Rome,” Lucilla, the daughter of Marcus Aurelius, says in the Coliseum as she cries over the body of Maximus. Ambition can indeed serve good ends, but throughout the film the substance of that dream eludes the Romans. What does “Rome” stand for? Which virtues? If only ambition, is that in itself really a virtue if it is by military conquest? This is a pitfall with virtue ethics. Leaving the content open can invite the sort of defense that someone as ethically sordid as Commodus can use—namely, that there are different virtues. It is not a matter for relativism that Maximus is ethically superior to Commodus; that they have different virtues does not equate the two men ethically.

When the film ends, we can expect that Senator Gracchus, whom Maximus has just set free from the imprisonment by Commodus, will do as Lucilla asks; Rome will again be a republic headed by the Senate and presumably two consuls. That Gracchus values the virtue of honor as a constraint on ambition is clear when he asks those gathered around Maximus’s dead body, “Who will help me carry him?” In utter contrast, Maximus has remarked to Commodus, "The time for honoring yourself will soon be at an end." The difference between people who value honor and those who do not is huge, and this can be seen in what other people say about a person. At the end of the film, no one wants to carry the dead, defeated body of the cheater-emperor, Commodus, whereas Maximus is already a hero because he fought for Rome as wanted by Marcus Aurelius, who directed Maximus to assume the reins of power in order to return Rome to the rule of the Senate.  

To be sustained again as a republic, Rome as an ideal to look up to and be proud of will depend on there being enough men of honor among the political and military elite. As nice as this sounds, the actual history of the Roman Republic and the ensuing Roman Empire demonstrate just how weak a reliance on a virtue can be in the face of raw ambition sans virtue, meaning ambition for its own sake, more territory for its own sake, and more power for its own sake. Choosing between alternative clusters of virtues may be akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic; as our species has evolved, we seem ill-equipped to give virtue its due when acting virtuously is no longer convenient.

Flight

With utility and consequences valued so much in Western society at least as of 2012, when the film, Flight, was released, the story-world of the film may seem odd in that doing what’s right comes out on top, even at the expense of knowingly losing benefits and incurring costs personally. In other words, deciding on the basis of conscience even at the expense of good consequences for oneself is possible even in a culture in which “saving one’s skin” rather than doing what is right is the norm. By immersing viewers in a story-world, a narrative with well-developed characters can highlight a societal blind-spot, and thus potentially result in a better society in which people make the effort to re-value their ethical values to the extent that their dominant values support consequentialism above standing on principle even though bad consequences for oneself can be anticipated. In the film, 96 out of 102 of the people on board survive the plane crash even though the metal bird had been in an uncontrolled vertical fall from 30,000 feet. How could the captain not be seen as a hero? If all that matters are results, 96 out of 102 is not bad at all, and being able to get out of a dive even as the tail stabilizer keeps pointing the plane downward is extraordinary.

The captain, together with one of the stewardesses, had been drinking alcohol and sniffing cocaine not only the night before the flight, but also within a few hours of take-off—on the theory that the cocaine would counter the drunkenness and thus render his brain fit to fly. Whip Whitaker is an active alcoholic and drug addict, and yet he had somehow managed to reach the rank of captain. His extraordinary flying techniques tell us that he is a very experienced pilot, and society, like the ancient Greeks, values excellence even as being a virtue in itself. In a flight simulator after the crash, no other pilot could safely land the plane, and yet Whitaker has done just that, in an open field—even having managed to keep the plane in the air through a populated area. So the ethics of him being drunk and high may seem to be moot, given his skill in being able to make up for any negative impacts. Even if there are no such impacts, there is concern that he was drinking vodka even during the flight. It is not just a matter of breaking rules. That he could have put the passengers’ lives in jeopardy may be enough to find him ethically culpable.

I contend that the captain did indeed contribute to the mechanical failure of the vertical stabilizer in the plane’s tail section, and thus to the crash itself. Although not causally related, that he slips on the first step of outdoor stairs, admittedly in the rain, on his way to the plane’s main door tells us that he is not as smooth as he pretends to be. More significantly, to get out of the admittedly severe turbulence while climbing to 9000 feet, he accelerates the plane faster than it should go in turbulence, and then just before “punching through” to smooth air, he accelerates even more, causing passengers to involuntarily lean forward in their seats. The ingested cocaine may be behind his excitement while the plane is climbing while still in the very rough air. Everyone else is in fear, but he is saying, “Ride em cowboy!” He is definitely high in more than one sense of the word. Pushing the plane beyond its mechanical limits may very likely be why the vital screw in the vertical stabilizer broke when the plane was stable at cruising altitude. So the fact that he was high (and drunk) may be very relevant indeed to why even just six people died (and others, including the copilot, were seriously injured).

The series of flying maneuvers that the caption puts into effect during the free-fall is extraordinary; even the co-pilot is not able to grasp why they could work, but they do. The result is an inverted, or upside-down plane flying at a low altitude horizontally until the captain has the copilot reverse to maneuvers to roll the plane around so it can land in a field. This reverse roll is excellent, and the captain even gets the pitch of the plane right. The film can be understood as intentionally presenting the viewers with an ethical problem wherein the captain’s violation of his duty to fly sober and his related choice to fly the ascending plane faster than its limit in turbulence, which, after all, was only severe for a moment and otherwise merely rough may have stressed the vertical stabilizer in the tail to the point of breaking are to be weighed against his masterful flying out of a dive and the consequence of only six people onboard dying. It is admittedly very difficult even for an ethicist to weigh such different factors, especially because good consequences are being put in relation to violating an important ethical duty for pilots. It is not as though religious belief can obviate coming to a verdict in terms of ethics. For centuries at least, the assumption that a person must be religious to be moral held up, though with the rise of secularity and humanism in the twentieth century in the West, ethics has to be taken seriously in itself.

The attitude of the film towards religion is equivocal. On the one hand, when a wing slices a church steeple in half, both the captain and the copilot seem to take the event as a sign having more meaning than would merely ruining part of a structure. That the reactions of both pilots are shown in slow motion suggests that a statement is being made about religion is intended by the filmmakers. In risking the lives of all 102 souls on board by drinking and snorting cocaine not only the night before, but also a few hours before take-off, Captain Whitaker is, as it were, offending the deity. The serious undertone of this is in contrast to the way in which organized religion is viewed through the film’s eyes. After the crash, the copilot, whose legs are crushed so he will never walk (or be able to fly) again, is at first furious with Whitaker, whose drinking the copilot had smelled before takeoff. Strangely, the copilot apparently forgives the captain and even asks him to pray in the hospital room along with the copilot’s wife. The religiosity seems too fake to be genuine; in fact, the copilot is probably using religion to repress his anger at the captain. Also after the crash, we are informed that the small group of Christians who had been outside their church whose steeple was smashed by the plane have been meeting outside every Sunday since that eventful day with the implication being that the field or the parishioners at the field has some kind of ongoing religious significance; the church itself is fine even though it is missing a steeple.

At the end of the film, Captain Whitaker is testifying before aviation regulators on the crash. Even though he is praised for his flying talent and his statement that he had not been drinking or inhaling cocaine was believed even by the chairwoman, he cannot bring himself morally to state that one of the stewardesses who died in the crash must have been coming to work intoxicated. Unknown to the pilot, that stewardess lost her life because she had unbuckled herself from her chair during the inverted part of the flight to save a boy who had fallen to the ceiling of the cabin. She, rather than the copilot or the church-goers who keep returning to the field to worship, represent genuine Christianity of the heart by evincing selfless compassion as if it were a basic human instinct. Whitaker has compassion for her memory and reputation and is thus finally willing to stand on moral principle even though he knows that the consequences will include years in prison.

Consequences, especially those that are beneficial to oneself, do not rule ethics; there are normative principles worth putting before positive consequences. The worth of such principles does not come from merely their function as a constraint on good consequences, for that would be a reduction to functionality. Even the captain’s excellent flying out of a vertical dive (after having flied badly in exceeding the plane’s speed limit for turbulence) does not outweigh even for him the worth of the ethical principle of telling the truth, especially in owning up to one’s own malfeasance and negligence. Film can indeed place an audience in an ethical quandary from which much can be learned as well as experienced about ethical theory. In the present case, deontology (e.g., duty) is not merely a constraint on how much benefit can be ethically sought and enjoyed.

Presence

The medium of film has great potential in playing with ontology, the branch of philosophy that asks (and tries to answer) the fundamental question: What really exists?  Put another way, what does it mean for something to exist. The being of “to be,” as opposed to not-be may be thought of, can be labeled as existential ontology. Whereas in the Hindu Upanishads, being itself is Brahman, which pervades everything in the realm of appearance, the Abrahamic religions posit the existence of a deity that creates existence and thus is its condition or foundation. Creation ex nihilo (i.e., from nothing) is another way of grasping why the Abrahamic god is not existence, or being, itself, for that which brought (and sustains) existence into (and as) being cannot logically be existence itself. Fortunately for most viewers who lead normal lives, the film, Presence (2024), does not hinge on such abstractions; the salience of ontology, or what is real beyond our daily experiences (in the realm of appearance), is merely implied in there being an entity that intriguingly is only a presence. It is real to both the main characters in the film’s world and to viewers of the film because of the inclusion of supernatural effects that the entity is able to register in the perception of the family living in the house. Crucially, such effects do not overwhelm the subtlety in how the presence is known to exist (i.e., be real). In this way, Presence succeeds where Poltergeist (1982) and Ghost (1990) do not: Presence is more philosophically intriguing and thought-provoking than the latter two films, and is thus a better example of the potential that the medium of film has in engaging viewers in philosophy. Being less oriented to visually titilating supernatural effects, Presence can better engage the mind philosophically. 

Presence can be regarded as instantiating an innovative approach to the horror genre. At the film’s very beginning, Chris (husband to Rebekah and father to Chloe and Tyler) corrects Rebekah regarding Chloe’s shock at the apparent drug-overdose of her best friend: “It’s not life; it’s death.” The tenuousness of the line between the two conditions—existing and not existing—is a leitmotif throughout the film. The film challenges this dichotomy itself, for in that story-world, people really do exist non-materially after the body dies. The modern default of medicine (and, more specifically, psychiatry) is evident in the film as Chloe’s parents grapple with Chloe’s sense of a dead girl’s presence in the house, but the supernatural eventually manifests even to Chris, Rebekah, and Tyler. Their notions of what is real—or, what really exists—is widened to include the existence of ghosts. Ironically, it takes manifestations that register in physics, such as books moving visually on their own, for the family to accept as a fact that reality includes entities that reside beyond the limits of (living) humans’ perception and even cognition. The modern assumption that natural science must be impacted in a supernatural way for the reality of an entity that lies beyond our realm to be accepted is erroneous yet it is accepted by the filmmakers and their characters in the film; the ghost need not act in ways that burst through into being perceived by the family for the ghost to exist, or even be known to exist. The psychic who visits the house is proof of there being sensed/known to be a presence even though no supernatural effects are witnessed. In fact, she knows that the ghost exists before Chris, Rebekah, and Tyler do.

The extension or deepening of reality to include entities that are in another realm from that of living people is “the reality” that the film presents. The very subtly of the presence (putting aside the supernatural events) invites philosophical reflection perhaps even more than reading a book on ontology does, for film engages sight (into a story-world) more tangibly than can the imagination) and hearing. The Matrix (1999), for example, does the human mind a great service in manifesting the philosophy of solipsism, the view that our brains are really in vats such that all that we perceive is an illusion, in a way that no one can get by reading a book. The human mind is such that when presented with vivid visuals and distinct tones of voice, the staying power is arguably longer than are sentences in a book. In Presence, the psychic describes the entity as “a presence that does not want to be forgotten.” Ideas can be like that too; hence it is a shame when a scholar dies before or without having published one’s knowledge, and that films perish before having been preserved.

Presence is especially ripe for philosophical reflection in furnishing the psychic’s description of the realm unknown to us wherein ghosts exist; it is not just in there being such a realm and thus an extension or depth of reality beyond appearance that the film furnishes to audiences. Whereas Chris can only admit, “There is mystery in this world,” the psychic describes the entity as suffering and being confused, for the past and present can be simultaneous for it. The entity can even anticipate the tragic accident that will occur in the house and even sense that there is a role for the entity itself to play in the incident. That the role is to protect Chloe even though the psychic says that the entity is not Chloe’s dead friend expands the viewers’ archetype of ghosts being angry and harmful. That the entity in Presence was not Chloe’s friend when alive renders the helpful nature even amid the anxiety of being in a realm that is qualitatively different from that of living humans all the more foreign to viewers, and thus intriguing philosophically. In short, going on to describe rather than merely stipulate the existence of a realm that is real and yet has very different dynamics than does the realm in which we live out our lives makes the film more philosophically interesting and idea-stimulating. Even though the viewers do not get the psychological payoff in being able to enter that realm vicariously by being shown it in the film, the point that reality is not exhausted or completely known to us comes through loud and clear.

Kant’s nominal realm of reality as distinct from his phenomenal realm of appearances may in fact be the basic paradigm on which the film and its story-world is founded. The philosopher’s theory that the human mind structures perceptions of space and time along rational lines is itself on the level of a paradigm. So too is Einstein’s theory of physics in which gravity can bend space itself and effect time, slowing it in proximity to a great mass. The film depicts space not as inert or static, as the entity can emit energy of such intensity and force that ripples in space are visible. As for time, I have already mentioned the observation of the psychic that the past and present are perceived as occurring simultaneously by the entity in the realm in which it found itself suddenly to be in at death. The line between living and death may be slim and thus easily and even accidentally crossed without notice, as the theologian and early-modern philosopher Jonathan Edwards sermonized to young people in an age in which they died in disproportionate numbers, yet the two distinct realms in Presence are very different—the paradigm in which the entity exists challenging and stimulating commonly held assumptions that we have from the world in which we live. Rendering the relativity or situatedness of our lived-in paradigm transparent to us is a great contribution that film-makers can make (and some have made) to the Hegelian progress of our species in coming to know itself in successively greater freedom. For being freed ideationally from our innate paradigm in being cognizant of its basic assumptions relative to others is indeed of value.

All That Heaven Allows

Film is an excellent medium for displaying and wrestling with practical philosophy, which includes ethics, political theory, and philosophy of religion (as well as aesthetics, which is a rather obvious topic for film). A film that has a character personifying a particular philosopher’s thought and antagonists rejecting that philosophy, and goes so far as to have a character read on-screen from a philosopher’s book, is the epitome of film doing philosophy. The film, All That Heaven Allows (1955), is such a film.

In the film, a widow, Cary, dates Ron, who is younger and, to her country-club socialite friends and two adult children, a working-class man. Ron’s circle of friends is hardly of the country-club sort, for his friends are lower rather than upper middle-class, and his tree business includes manual labor. However, he owns the business and is free of any time-clock, so he is not a man in the working-class. Although more difficult to spot in the film, the resistance may actually be to Ron’s living out of Henry David Thoreau’s (1817-1862) philosophy. Douglas Sirk, the film’s director, relates this philosophy to nature, as it is on display from inside Ron’s living-room window of his newly renovated country house next to a stream. To what extent a return to nature is necessary in living out Thoreau’s philosophy is one question Sirk may have intended to raise with viewers. Even Thoreau himself did not view nature in idyllic terms; nor did he advocate having to be perpetually in it to be recharged from it. Indeed, living amid nature presents our species with challenges, as it does Ron in the film when he falls off a cliff on his property. In the film, this question is set through the lens of whether Ron could be content leaving his country house to live in Cary’s house in town.

Douglas Sirk (1897-1987) was a German (though of Danish parentage) film director who left Nazi Germany after his Jewish wife was prosecuted for being Jewish. At Hamburg University, he studied philosophy and history of art. Out of this background, it is no surprise that he would Jane Wyman to hold up a copy of Thoreau’s book as Cary in full view of a camera and read aloud in a scene. In his films, Sirk portrayed characters trapped by social conventions sympathetically. His genre was thus melodrama. Perhaps it was his rejection of Nazi social conventions that gave him such sympathy for characters who suffer from such conventions; indeed, once in Hollywood, he directed the anti-Nazi film, Hitler’s Madman (1942). Perhaps also his move from Germany to California showed him how artificial social conventions are—not only because they can differ so much from culture to culture, but also because those in “tinsel town” can be so utterly petty and fake. In any case, Sirk’s antipathy toward social convention does not necessarily mean that he favored a return or escape to nature, and thus the sort of life that Thoreau lived in New England.

In the film, Thoreau’s nonconformist individualism is made explicit as Cary reads from the philosopher’s book, Walden at the house of two of Ron’s friends, a married couple, who also live in the country. “The mass of men live lives of quiet desperation,” Cary reads out loud as Alida listens attentively. “Why should we be in such desperate haste to succeed? If a man does not keep pace with his companions, perhaps it’s because he hears a different drummer. Let him step to the music which he hears however measured, or far away.” The desperation is quiet because the masses repress their expressive urges in order to conform to societal standards, which in turn is presumed necessary to achieving and maintaining position. For example, large companies in the 1950s favored managers who were married over than single for promotion.

After listening, Alida says in reference to Thoreau’s book and her husband, “That’s Mick’s bible; he quotes from it constantly.” Cary asks about Ron, and Alida answers, “I don’t think Ron’s ever read it; he just lives it.” The audience is left with the impression that this is clearly superior. Elaborating on her husband, Alida then says, “Mick thought, well, like a lot of people, that if he had money and an important position, it would make him secure. Ron had neither one and didn’t seem to need them. [Mick] was baffled. The answer? To thine own self be true. That’s Ron. Ron’s security comes from within himself, and nothing can ever take it away from him. Ron absolutely refuses to let unimportant things be important. Our whole life was devoted to keeping up with the Joneses. [Mick] decided to get off that merry-go-round.” Outsourcing self-esteem to be determined or even conditioned by what other people think or say does not bring the sort of psychological stability that is based on self-acceptance “as is.”

As for external crutches like wealth, position, and societal status, such things can be fleeting and are thus not really reliable. Furthermore, a person can always have more money, higher office, or societal status, so the “rat race” goes on and on. In his book, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Gregory Bateson refers to such maximizing variables, which increase without an internal limitation, as schizogenic forces, which he distinguishes from the homeostatic ecologizing forces that seek an equilibrium instead. The two types of forces are fundamentally different—qualitatively so, differing in kind. An equilibrium, as in perpetually feeling content in one’s own skin as Ron does, is a much better foundation for being at peace with oneself than is a maximizing approach to external assets, whether they be money, position, or societal status. In the film, Wall Street (1987), Bud asks his sordid mentor, Gordon Gekko, “How much is enough, Gordon?” The Wall Street investor replies, “It’s not a question of enough.” A person can never had enough money to satisfy the schizogenic desire for more. Were Ron asked that question in All that Heaven Allows, he would probably just shrug. Ron is unphased when Cary’s son, Ned, asks, “Is there any money in trees?” Ron owns a tree business.

Ron absolutely refuses to let unimportant things be important. Being true to himself and not trying to be someone else to please other people are important to Ron. Cary tells her daughter Kay, “Ron has no intention of fitting in; he’s content the way he is.” To the social-conformist, externally-oriented mother and her two grown children, Ron might as well be on another planet. Such different orientations to social reality and selfhood placed in contact can spark conflict out of fear (of the otherness of the other, as if it were inherently a threat), jealousy, resentment, and outright anger. Ned exclaims to his mother about the possibility of her marrying Ron. “The whole thing is impossible!” Although Ned incorrectly assumes that Ron is working class, and objects to that, and that Cary is only interested in Ron’s muscles, and objects to that, I submit that the real basis of the rejection by Kay and Ned is that Ron’s center of gravity is inward, and that is radically different than an outward, societally-oriented focus. Kay realizes how fundamentally different these two orientations are. “Mother desires group approval,” and she is conventional,” Kay explains to Ron. Such a fundamental difference dwarfs differences in wealth and age. Ned’s explosive threat to his mother evinces an eruption of strong emotion too disproportionate to be accounted for by an objection to Ron’s relative economic condition. “Don’t expect me to come visit you! How could I bring my friends,” Ned nearly shouts, “I’d be ashamed!” The age difference between Cary and Ron, and Ron’s financial situation are not so obvious that Ned’s friends would be embarrassed. Something more is going on: two fundamentally different orientations to self-worth are put in contact and are clashing.

Unwilling to adapt, emotionally stunted, and trapped as if in a tomb, Cary, Kay and Ned unconsciously may feel envious, threatened and perhaps even inferior standing next to Ron’s inner peace. Even Cary rejects Ron, and in so doing, the philosophy that he lives by. “The only thing that matter is us,” Ron pleads with Cary as he sees her being pulled by the gravity of the egos around her. Things that happen in the past are unimportant, Ron assures her. Which car the couple takes to the socialites’ party at Sarah’s house doesn’t matter. That a woman at the party says with disdain in seeing Ron’s car, “Just look at that car!” doesn’t matter. That a man says, “So that’s Cary’s nature boy” doesn’t matter. That Cary accidently breaks the tea pot that Ron has fixed does not matter. Finally, that Cary is staying late at Ron’s doesn’t matter. Ron’s ability to put things in perspective comes from the fact that he is true to himself and thus doesn’t not feel the need to become someone else to please others.

To people oriented to people-pleasing in order to feel accepted, and thus of value, Ron’s dismissiveness of the truly unimportant could be annoying. People do argue about what is important. Even though Ron and Cary can start a new life in the mill that he has renovated to create a home for him and her, I think Ron would move in with Cary at her house were she to insist. To live among people who are alike in how they are fundamentally different from oneself cannot be easy, even for someone like Ron whose sense of inner-worth does not depend on what others say or think about him. To be sure, being comfortable in his own shoes, whether boots or slippers, Ron doesn’t have to live in nature, and Thoreau would agree that it is not necessary; periodic refreshers are sufficient. However, socializing with Cary’s friends would be difficult. The only time Ron’s anger flares is at the party at Sarah’s house, which is filled with the wealthy socialites who know Cary. Those guests blame Ron for scolding Howard for kissing Cary against her will. It is actually Cary who pushes Howard back, so Ron is quite obviously being scapegoated. Whether caused by fear, dislike, or jealousy in others, being scapegoated can take a hard psychological toll on anyone, even someone such as Ron whose emotional stability does not rest on external acceptance. A person can take only so much, and Ron’s flash of anger at the party may suggest that Ron would ultimately leave Cary’s world, with or without her. There are limits even to what self-acceptance can tolerate in a hostile environment.

In the movie Animal House (1978), a “nerd” and a fat guy go to a rush party of a college fraternity; they are quickly directed to sit with the other “losers” while the actual potential pledges are allowed to socialize with the head of the fraternity and other members, which includes the editor of the student newspaper. The two guys would never be accepted in that fraternity; in fact, they would be teased and ultimately rejected where they to stay. Fortunately, they find a frat where they fit.

Fortunately, Cary enjoys herself at the party given by Ron’s friends even though she knows she is different. Yet unlike Cary’s friends of Ron, Ron’s friends are tolerant and include her in the fun. Furthermore, Ron and Cary can be a couple at that party. So even though Cary is scared and emotionally beholden to her children and socialite friends, she is attracted to Ron’s world. After all, it is her who reads Thoreau. Philosophy can indeed play a salient role in film.