Anne Frank Remembered

While studying at Yale, I took a seminar on documentaries following two other, more pertinent film courses on narrative itself. I even took a preaching seminar on story-telling. The documentary choice was off my trajectory. The opportunity cost was large, considering that I was otherwise taking courses in Yale’s better-reputed humanities fields of philosophy of religion, theology, and history. Now perhaps my excursion into the documentary genre can bear some fruit, for I analyze here the documentary, Anne Frank Remembered (1995). The strength of this documentary I take to be its reliance on witnesses even at the expense of narration to tell the story. People could say with definiteness what had happened to Anne Frank since she and her sister and parents left Amsterdam. Their journey evinced the mentality of the Nazis as one not just as dehumanizing the Jews, but as treating them worse than livestock. Even when Nazi Germany was losing the war, the Nazis foreswore the use-value of the Jews starved or gassed.

The eye-witness account of the Franks’ train trip from Vesterborgh, a transfer camp in The Netherlands, to Auschwitz in southeast Poland. The trip for the 1,019 “passengers” began on September 3, 1944 and lasted three days. The Jews onboard were in cramped livestock cars that uncomfortably held forty to fifty people. The “passengers” had to sit mostly, though some had to stand even while “sleeping.” Urination and defecation make the trip worse still. The Jews felt completely powerless. “We felt the end would not be good,” the eye-witness said. Even so, “we refused to imagine the worst.”

The worst was Auschwitz. The Nazis there told the new arrivals that they would die there. “Our brains functioned differently,” the eye-witness from the train said. It was a matter of survival. Crucially, she added, “We were less than beasts—less than animals.” This is reflected not only at the camp, but in the train ride as well. At least animals would have been fed en route. At Auschwitz, the food consisted of a piece of bad bread.

On October 28, 1944, the two Frank sisters were sent to Bergen Belsen Camp in Germany. New buildings were under construction, so the Jews had to spend the upcoming winter cramped in unheated tents. On November 7, a fierce storm destroyed some of the tents. The Jews were being deliberately starved, frozen, and racked with disease even though the medications were not far away. In this sense too, the Jews were not only dehumanized, but also treated less well than beasts. After all, who would starve an animal that could otherwise be of some use? Both Margret and Anne succumbed to disease late that winter. The subsequent publication of Anne’s diary vindicated her potential “use-value” to German society as a notable writer, yet she was intentionally starved and not treated.

Without a doubt, being at a death camp triggered changes to the occupants’ minds so they could adapt to survive in a context in which survival was forbotten. So too, the minds of the men who decided to treat certain humans worse than animals must also have been warped. The variability of the human mind is perhaps here the real culprit. Specifically, that a mind could find meaning in a situation that was essentially a slaughter house, and another mind could think of other people as having worth less than that of livestock, tell us that this species, homo SAPIENS, cannot safely rely on its mind as a safeguard or reality-tester. Especially as time passes, the documentary may hopefully become more and more estranger in the sense of being not only foreign, but strange as well. The mentalities discussed from up close may be so far from those of the viewers that the inescapable inference will be that the mind itself cannot be trusted; it can treat as valid some of the most horrendous notions and related ways of treating other people. Even the way the brain seeks to preserve its sanity in an awful situation attests to the mind’s willingness to leave reality behind. In the documentary, even the Jews themselves who were in the Holocaust look back at how their minds changed and remarked at how strange (and dramatic) the change was. Watching the Israeli court’s coverage of the Adolf Eichmann trial in 1961 can give the viewer an eerie sense of the mentality on the other side, which, in being preoccupied with making the trains run efficiently, merely assumed that the living cargo was less than animals. It is the mind’s presumption to being right when it was so utterly wrong that was perhaps really on trial. 

Aimee & Jaguar

Aimee & Jaguar (1999) is a film based on a true story centering on Felice, a Jewish woman who lived in Berlin until 1944 and belonged to an underground lesbian, anti-Nazi (spying) organization. To be a Jewish lesbian in Nazi Germany cannot have been an easy life, with possible catastrophe just around the corner on any given day.  In the film, Felice becomes romantically involved with Lilly, a mother of four and wife to a Nazi solder who is fighting at the eastern front. The film is essentially a love story between the two women. I want to draw out some of the ethical issues raised in the film—with the love story serving as my critique of two ethical theories—utilitarianism and duty-based ethics—that are implied in the film.  

Bentham’s ethical theory of utilitarianism has for its goal the greatest good, which is maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain, for the greatest number of people. In terms of distribution, the principle can justify allocating a lot of money to some groups—whose individuals can be expected to get a lot of pleasure out of the funds—while depriving other groups of any money because they would not get a lot of pleasure out of even the limited funds. Invest in pleasure where most of it is likely to result. It is the consequence, rather than the means, that is important.

Under such a lopsided distribution as making what money there is available to non-Jewish Germans, the notion of declining marginal utility means that a lot more money would have to be added to the rich Germans to give pleasure equal to that which would come from giving the impoverished groups even just a little money. The utility of 1 DM, for instance, after getting 99 DM is less than the utility after getting 2 DM. This point is illustrated in the film.

In one scene, a fur-wearing, wealthy German woman, sensing that Felice and her three friends, Ilse, Lotte, and Klara, in the bathroom are hungry, and Jewish, sells them food-stamps for nothing less than 200 marks—an extravagant sum judging from the reaction of the three Jews. Based on declining marginal utility, it would take such a sum of money for the pleasure obtained by the rich woman to equal the pleasure from the mere food-stamps accruing to the four Jews. Hence, the exploitation.

The utilitarian distribution cutting off some people or entire groups from funds needed for daily sustenance can be extended to include outright extermination. In Nazi Germany, exterminated groups included the Communists, homosexuals, and Jews. Felice and her three friends were on the losing end in at least two of the three. It is ethically problematic that Bentham’s theory could be used in such a way to justify investing only in people who are most able to be happy (feel pleasure), whether from inner constitution or by external circumstance. Maximizing the pleasure in a society overall is an aim that can justify means that can easily be viewed as unethical. In fact, the resulting pleasure overall, as it is distributed in society (i.e., unequally) can be viewed as unethical. Fortunately, we can turn to Kant to make up for Bentham’s lapses.  

In contrast to Bentham’s theory, Immanuel Kant held that people have a duty to treat other rational beings not merely as means, but also as ends in themselves. Reason, by which we assign value to things (and people) is itself of absolute value, and so rational beings should not be treated merely as means, but are worthy by virtue of having reasoning capability of being treated as ends in themselves. This version of Kant’s Categorical Imperative is similar to the Golden Rule in Christianity (Kant was Christian). For the Nazi leaders to treat groups of people as means only to a Nazi vision of society and race would be for Kant, unethical.

Yet is it reasoning that gives humanity its absolute value? In the film, Felice refuses to go with her friends on a train to safety in Switzerland because she loves Aimee and thus wants to stay with her; the decision taken is not rational, for Felice must know that she could have gone and returned after the fall of the Third Reich; she must also have known that she would probably not survive for long, even if the days of Nazi Germany were obviously limited. “A catastrophe,” Aimee’s mother says when she learns, after Felice has returned from the train station, that she is not only her daughter’s girlfriend, but also Jewish. In such a context, how much value can we put on Felice’s love for Aimee? It seems to me that reason cannot assign value to such an object of such power, so such value must be undefined, and thus absolute. Means and even lofty ends that slight the human natural ability to love face an uphill fight in claims to being ethical rather than unethical.