Roger Boisjoly was a booster rocket engineer at a NASA contractor, Morton Thiokol. Boisjoly blew the whistle both within the company and to NASA regarding the danger of the rubber in the o-rings, which seal the connections in the shuttle’s rockets, being insufficiently elastic in cold weather. Although The Challenger Disaster (2019) is not a documentary, the film’s narrative, which centers on Roger, or "Adam," is oriented to understanding why the Challenger space shuttle exploded after being launched on January 28, 1986. In other words, although some names are different and the conversations are not verbatim in the film, the factors that contributed to the actual explosion are presented. In fact, the film leans too much on technical details before the disaster and legal arguments afterwards without adequate entertaining elements to make the film enjoyable. However, the film's political function in informing a mass market of why part of the government-business system was broken is valuable. In fact, this mission demonstrates that the medium of motion pictures is capable of aiding in social, political, economic, and religious awareness and education, and thus development.
Although some individuals can rightly be blamed for the explosion, the problem extended to the relationship that NASA had with its contractors, the encroachment, based solely on power, of management both at NASA and Mortan Thiokol, over experts (i.e., the engineers) on a technical problem requiring expertise, and the internal culture at Mortan Thiokol. In general terms, the problem extended to business-government relations, managerial presumption, and the expedient profit motive in business.
On the individual level, immaturity played a substantial role in the disaster. Throughout
most of the film, Adam, the outspoken advocate of delaying the launch, is yelling either at his superiors at Mortan Thiokol or at
the launch engineer at NASA. Adam’s harsh demeanor, a lawyer points out, partly
explains why Adam’s warnings did not have sufficient traction especially within
the company. In spite of being right about the explosion, Adam has very little credibility inside the company because of his immaturity. In other words, he does not play well with the other children and this impedes his technical credibility. Human nature being what it is, it is susceptible to the fallacy that immaturity undercuts technical expertise. To be sure, Adam was not the only problem-child at the company. Its in-house inspector, Frank, perpetually shouts at Adam from the time he warns that the shuttle could explode. At one point, Frank even lunges violently at Adam. Similarly, NASA's flight engineer's harsh tone and shouting on the conference call with Mortan Thiokol exacerbated the problem. Why so much anger? It clearly impedes a solution whereby nine astronauts would not have died.
All the shouting also makes the film difficult to endure. The bland office settings also do nothing to make the film enticing to watch. Almost all of the scenes are set in drab offices and a conference room in which grey is the basic color. To the extent that the arguments over technical details, which dominate the film, and legal arguments are boring, they are not adequately countered by entertaining devices. For example, scant attention is given to Adam's family life, other than to show him strangely well-adapted as a family man. His pathology apparently only shows up at work. His wife is a cut-board figure of an adoring wife, which is also strange. In short, the film’s value to American society in explaining to a mass audience what went wrong both at NASA and it having private-sector contractors could have been greater were the film more entertaining.
This is not to say that the extent of arguing, like that of the technical details and even the drabness do not contribute to the film's ability to explain why the disaster occurred. The incessant arguments give the audience a good dose of the role of pathology in the disaster. Also, the extent of technical details, even repeated throughout the film, help the audience to understand why the o-rings failed. Even the drabness of the offices give the viewers a sense of the company's finances, which in turn play a major role in why the company's managers overrule the engineers on economic grounds (over technical objections).
As
for the technical explanation of the disaster, the expected temperature on the
Cape at launch the next morning was 30 degrees F. The shuttle’s o-rings, which the
contractor put into the rockets to seal connection points, were made out of rubber,
which is less elastic, and thus effective, as the temperature decreases. The
company’s data, however, only went down to 53 degrees, the previous lowest
temperature on a launch. Also, the lower the temperature, the more exhaust
passes by the o-rings, causing erosion. This
is enough for Adam, who repeatedly says, “It’s too cold to launch!” He put his
findings in a memo, but not even the company’s inspection person, Frank,
bothered to read it. “The shuttle is made up of millions of parts,” Frank shouts
at Adam, adding “The o-ring is just one of them.” Adam shouts back, “Cold rubber doesn’t work
well!” Notably, Frank does not spend as much time reminding Adam that the
company needs the contract as reminding Adam and the others that they need
their jobs. So much for loyalty to the company; what really counts is the
employees’ personal affairs.
Frank
takes the matter to his boss, Kurt. He wants a launch-delay because time is
needed to get boats out to retrieve the rockets when they fall into the ocean.
Adam argues that the company’s recommendation to NASA should turn on an
engineering reason rather than a company-specific economic one. In essentially dismissing the consensus of the engineers regarding the technical problems, Kurt, a manager, disagrees. “We might lose our rockets. Besides, the
DOD pays NASA’s bills. If they don’t get what they paid for, DOD and NASA might
replace us. It is an economic problem.” Relative to this problem, a higher
manager will later say before giving NASA the go-ahead on the launch, the
safety of the astronauts “is not our concern” even though the astronauts have
been relying on NASA and the contractors.
In
the film, the company’s organizational culture is highly dysfunctional. The company’s upper management is focused only on keeping
its contract with NASA even though the result is far worse for the company. The
management has allowed the company to become too financially dependent on NASA.
As a result, the upper management lied to NASA, telling the flight engineer
that the company would be fine with the launch as set. Faced with an enquiry by
the presidential commission on the disaster, the company’s management claims
that Adam was a malcontent employee wanting to cause trouble. The extent of
lying is itself a red flag concerning the lack of business ethics in the
company’s management.
The
relationship between NASA and the contract is also a contributing cause of the
disaster. This is evident from the conference call that includes NASA and the
contractor the day before the launch. NASA’s flight engineer, who is openly
hostile toward the contractor from the start, begins by pointing out that the
contractor (Frank in particular) is at fault for having taking the temperature
problem off the reports submitted to NASA.
The company is so dependent on its rocket contract with NASA that the
employee tasked with keeping NASA informed has removed a potentially dangerous
problem from NASA’s radar screen.
The
lack of communication is compounded by the adversarial relationship. On the
call, for instance, Adam and the flight engineer at NASA reach the point of shouting
at each other. The engineer orders Adam to “quantify.” Adam replies, ”I can’t.”
In public policy as in business, not everything can be given a number.
Sometimes when one is given, it brings with it false accuracy. With data only
going down to 53 degrees, Adam cannot put a number on the percentage risk.
Furthermore, how high of a percentage risk that the o-rings will fail on launch
at 30 degrees could the flight engineer accept? The flight engineer wants a
number to protect himself. Just as the managers at the contractor don’t want to
lose their jobs, neither does the flight engineer. Meanwhile, no one is looking
out for the human beings who will blast off the next day.
NASA cannot go against the contractor’s
recommendation to stop the launch. The flight engineer knows this, so he puts
pressure on the contractor’s managers, who capitulate because the company cannot
lose the contract. In bending NASA’s policy by pushing for a reversal from the
contractor—and by the company’s management overruling the engineers on an
engineering problem—the flight engineer is reckless (even as he tries to
protect himself by demanding quantification).
In
response, the contractor’s managers huddle. “NASA might find another contractor
if we recommend delaying launch,” one manager says. “NASA might lay off people.
15,000 jobs here are on the line; we need this contract.” The manager then
says to the entire group, “We need to make a management decision.” One of the
engineers then shouts, “We cannot guarantee a good seal!” The manager appeals
to the personal financial interests of all the engineers in the room. “Don’t you have a mortgage? Don’t you want
your jobs?” Adam chimes in, “There are nine astronauts; their lives are in our
hands. The manager coldly replies, “they know the risks; that’s not our
concern.” This brings Adam to a rage, “How dare you play with human lives like
that. . . . You won’t give these poor souls a chance so we can make a buck or
two. . . . This is not a management decision.”
That manager ignores this point and tells NASA it’s a go.
The
philosopher Kant’s ethical theory can be formulated in terms of treating other
rational beings not just as means, but also as ends in themselves. The
contractor’s managers treat the astronauts unethically because they are just a
means to the company getting paid for its rockets. NASA’s flight engineer does
the same thing. NASA has already delayed
the launch, and avoiding the embarrassment of delaying again, even by hours, is
motivating the flight engineer at the expense of the astronauts. Both NASA and
the contractor’s management have lost perspective with selfish, skewed
priorities.
